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ABSTRACT 
We consider the situation in which a buyer has to find the optimal degree of bundling for buying goods 
and services. From a review of the literature we develop attributes associated with bundling. Each of 
these attributes has an effect on the value of a bundle. Combined, the attributes determine the value of a 
bundle. We describe how the various attributes of a bundle contribute to the value of a bundle given the 
context of the buying situation. Based on interviews, a further analysis of bundle attributes and their 
effects on the bundle value is provided. The results of this analysis can be used to assist in finding the 
optimal degree of bundling. 
 
Keywords: bundles value, buying decisions, degree of bundling 
 
INTRODUCTION OF THE TOPIC 
When a buyer has to purchase a set of products and/or services he searches for the optimal way to buy 
on the market. One of the decisions the buyer has to make is whether he bundles the products and/or 
services or buys them in separate lots. For example, buying various products and services needed for a 
construction project separately is an alternative to buying a complete project (turn key). In practice 
these decisions are rarely taken consciously: often buyers immediately move on to selecting the right 
supplier for the products or services. A conscious decision about the degree of bundling is often 
omitted. In this paper we present a framework for making bundling decisions and we introduce the 
concept of bundling attributes. These bundling attributes contribute to the value of a bundle and can be 
used as a basis for a well-informed bundling decision. We discuss the attributes and their effects on the 
value of a bundle based on a number of practical bundling decisions reviewed with purchasers.  
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LITERATURE ON BUNDLING 
Purchasers have considered bundling options for centuries, though little academic discussions seem to 
be devoted to the decision problem (Schoenherr and Mabert, 2008). Most of the bundling literature has 
been written from a seller’s perspective in either a marketing or economics literature. In the next two 
subsections, we discuss the buyer’s and seller’s perspectives in more detail.  
 
Bundling from a seller’s perspective 
From a seller’s perspective, marketing literature on bundling has examined the firm’s promoting and 
pricing of bundles (e.g. Ansari, Siddarth, and Weinberg, 1996; Ben-Akiva and Gershenfeld, 1998), 
consumer evaluation of bundles (e.g. Johnson, Herrmann, and Bauer, 1999; Soman and Gourville, 
2001), and the optimality of bundling (e.g. Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 2000; Wilson et al., 1990). 
Economics literature has mainly focused on bundling as an entry deterrence mechanism (e.g. Nalebuff, 
2004; Carlton and Waldman, 2002), bundling and efficiency (e.g. Fang and Norman, 2003), and 
bundling as a profit-maximizing mechanism (e.g. Armstrong, 1999; Avery and Hendershott, 2000). 
Stremersch and Tellis (2002) state, in their examination of the literature on bundling from a seller’s 
perspective, that there is no integrative framework that explains what an optimal bundle is, given 
various factors that have an effect on an optimal bundle. Also, they state that the literature is 
ambiguous about definitions for bundling and key conditions for optimal bundling. This makes it even 
more difficult to develop a framework for making optimal bundling decisions from a buyer’s 
perspective. 
 
Bundling from a buyer’s perspective 
The body of literature on bundling from a buyer’s perspective is much smaller than that from the 
seller’s perspective. Only a few topics in bundling have been covered from a buyer’s perspective. The 
study of Mabert and Schoeherr (2001) showed that choosing the right bundle structure significantly 
influences the buyer’s perceived performance of the bundle. This importance of the bundle structure 
was later confirmed by Beall et al. (2003). This stresses the importance of the decision on the correct 
bundle structure.  
 
Reasons for bundling by buyers are the benefits towards lowering the administrative costs, such as 
ordering costs (Looman, Ruffin and de Boer, 2002). Other authors mention benefits of bundling such as 
an increase of buying power (Ramsay, 2001; Schoenherr and Mabert, 2006) or an increase of 
economies of scale (Birou, Fawcett and Magnan, 1997). However, few studies have provided variables 
that influence an appropriate bundling structure, or tried to construct a framework that can be used to 
determine an appropriate bundling structure. Perhaps Jap’s (2002) suggestion of an optimal bundle 
structure in terms of number of items and purchasing spend comes closest. She poses that bundles 
should have a high number of items and a high spend. This should be weighted against the potential 
inability of suppliers to deliver and the loss of competition. The paper by Jap provides useful 
suggestions, but does not provide a framework or even a list of variables.  
Other research on bundling from a buyer’s perspective focuses on bundles for reverse auctions. The 
achievement of price reductions by increasing the number of different bundles in the same bidding 
event has been reported by Carter et al (2004) and Hur et al. (2006). Changing the bundle composition 
for repeat auctions can also help to further reduce the price (Arnold et al., 2005). Still, they do not 
study finding the right bundle composition itself. 
 
This paper adds to the limited body of research on bundling from a buyer’s perspective. Besides adding 
new reasons for bundling to the existing literature, we aim to improve the understanding on bundling 
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composition by combining these reasons in a framework that can be used to determine an appropriate 
bundling structure. 
 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The ambiguity in the literature on definitions of bundling, as stated by Stremersch and Tellis (2002) in 
the previous section, calls for a further critical analysis. Not clearly defining terms as bundling and 
bundling strategies would make it difficult to compare this study with the literature.  
 
Bundling 
Many different definitions of bundling have been proposed in the literature. For example, Adams and 
Yellen (1976) define bundling as “selling goods in packages”. Guiltinan (1987) defines bundling as 
“the practice of marketing two or more products and/or services in a single package for a special price”, 
and Salinger (1995) treats a pair of shoes as a bundle. These examples do not only show that definitions 
of bundling are fuzzy and not consistent (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002), they are also unclear about the 
distinction between product and bundle (see the definition of Sallinger) and domain of the use of 
bundling (see the definition of Guiltinan). We propose a definition for bundling from a buyer’s 
perspective that tries to overcome the inconsistencies present in the literature. 
 
We propose the definition of bundling as the buying of two or more undividable products in one 
package. We define the term ‘undividable’ in means as undividable for buyer’s markets. We explain 
this term by a short example. Consider buying a bundle of electricity for two office buildings. 
According to the definition this will be a bundle of two products; you can find a supplier willing to 
deliver electricity for one of your office locations. Buying electricity for a part of an office building 
would be much harder, because no markets exist for supplying electricity to parts of office buildings. 
So the undividable product of the bundle is one office building. Considering this example will make it 
clear that most of the purchasing transaction in practice do have some degree of bundling inherent to 
them. It is our purpose to contribute towards finding an optimal degree of bundling. 
 
Bundle strategies 
Bundle strategies studied from a buyer’s perspective have not been defined very clear. Examples of 
bundle strategies are described as increasing leverage by size and increasing the number of items in a 
bundle (Jap, 2002), bundling of part families (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003), and the bundling of items in 
the same commodity group (Beall et al., 2003). These strategy descriptions, although suitable in their 
specific context, are not generic in use. Based on interviews with purchasers we identify two generic 
bundling strategies. 
 
1. Homogeneous bundling strategy: expanding your bundle homogeneously is done by adding more of 
the same products to those that you already have in your bundle. Every bundle has a dimension, called 
the degree of homogeneous bundling; the amount of exactly the same products in the bundle. 
 
Example from the interviews: That is our default, we bundle the same products over our three 
locations, unless […] we have done that with catering and some IT hardware. 
 
2. Heterogeneous bundling strategy: expanding your bundle heterogeneously is done by adding 
different products to those you already have in your bundle. Every bundle has a dimension, called the 
degree of heterogeneous bundling; the amount of different products in the bundle. 
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Example from the interviews: We had to build the hangars, the building for the restaurant and 
the platforms […] we saw that as one job. 
With the definition of these two strategies we can classify every bundle, in their degree of bundling, 
both homogeneously or heterogeneously. Later in this paper we will show that different bundling 
strategies also create different bundling effects. 
 
THE VALUE OF BUNDLING 
In their search for the optimal bundle structure, buyers assess various bundle options, which vary in 
bundling degree, either homo- and heterogeneously. Each of those bundle options has several bundle 
attributes, which can have favorable or not so favorable effects in the eyes of buyers. For example, the 
bundle attribute economies of scale (Looman et al., 2001) is different for each bundle option. More 
bundling often generates more discounts on the price by economies of scale, although in a decreasing 
manner. We call this the effect of the bundle attribute. In another example, the bundle attribute of 
competition (Jap, 2002) could have the effect of higher prices paid with more bundling, due to 
constrained capacities or capabilities of the suppliers. We can visualize these effects as a function of 
the bundling benefits versus the degree of bundling. In Figure 1, we show how such functions could 
look like.  
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Figure 1: the effects of two bundle attributes  
 
A buyer faces the complex task to assess the various options in bundling. He looks at the attributes of 
the various options; he estimates their effects and the final trade-off. We call this trade-off between 
various effects of the bundle attributes the bundle value. With these definitions we can describe the 
bundling value in terms of the various effects of the bundle attributes. 
 
Bundling value = effect (attribute 1) + effect (attribute 2) + effect (attribute …)   (1) 
 
If we continue the example from the beginning of this section, the bundle value would be the 
summation of the bundling benefits of competition and the economies of scale. In figure 2, we visualize 
how the function of bundle value could look like. The differences in the effects show us the existence 
of an optimal degree op bundling, at which the bundling value is at its maximum. It is this maximum 
value that purchasers want to achieve with their bundling strategies. 
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Figure 2: the bundle value  
 
In this paper we will make a start with unraveling the bundling attributes and their effects. In the next 
section we will give an overview of all attributes and their effects on the bundle value. 
 
RESULTS 
In order to get a more thorough understanding about bundle attributes and their effects on the bundle 
value, seven exploratory interviews were conducted. These interviews were conducted with one or two 
experienced purchasers at the same time, for a total of 10 interviewees. In each of the interviews we 
discussed a number of cases on bundling. In total we discussed 23 cases with the interviewees. The 
interviewed purchasers were faced with the decision how to bundle in their daily activities. The 
purchasers were chosen to represent a variety of organizations. This included government departments, 
police departments, schools, energy providers and tobacco manufacturers. 
 
In the interviews, the purchasers were asked if they could name the various bundled options they have 
had in various tenders and buying situations. Also they were asked if they could elaborate on the 
reasons for choosing one particular bundling option. In this way we accessed the vast experience of the 
purchasers on decision-making on bundling. The interviews were semi-structured to enable the 
interviewer to pursue interesting statements and elaborate on them during the interview. The interviews 
took on average one hour and were taped and coded. The codes were used to find a list of unique forms 
of bundling attributes and their effects. These codes were created during the analyses of the tapes. In 
Table 1 we present the bundling attributes and their effects as they emerged from the interviews. 
 
Bundling 
attribute 
Description and example 
 
Main effect on 
bundling value by 
Dependency 
 
 
The components of the bundle depend on each other in time, 
management or planning. There is an overlap or integration of 
the components. 
 
Example from the interviews: when different components of the 
installation are highly dependent on each other that would be a 
reason for us to buy in a bundle. 
 
Coordination costs 
Table 1 – the bundling attributes and their effects 
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Bundling 
attribute 
Description and example 
 
Main effect on 
bundling value by 
Selection 
 
 
The supply of the components is passed on to subcontractors. 
 
Example from the interviews: why don’t we split it up, then the 
subcontractors can place bids […] they are cheaper. 
 
Quality of the bids 
Outsourcing  
 
 
There is some need of coordination between the components, 
which can be done by the suppliers or by the buyer. 
 
Example from the interviews: it is the policy here to leave the 
coordination to the suppliers […] we want to keep it as simple 
as possible here. 
 
Coordination costs 
Specialization 
 
 
The delivery of the components is the core-business of the 
suppliers that can deliver the bundle. 
 
Example from the interviews: if it doesn’t belong to the core-
business of the supplier, we split it off, that makes it commercial 
more interesting. 
 
Quality of the bids 
Competition The volume of the bundle generates enough competition, as well 
as on the short as on the long term. 
 
Example from the interviews: you can bundle, but not too much, 
the bundle must be interesting for small and large companies. 
 
Quantity of the bids 
Purchasing 
effort 
The effort of buying the components in a bundle or separately. 
 
Example from the interviews: if you are going to buy all the 
activities separately, you do not want to know how much time 
that is going to take. 
 
Purchasing process 
costs 
Economies of 
scale 
The quantity discounts that are offered on a bundle. 
 
Example from the interviews: with this size the bundle just had a 
nice volume that generated some discount benefits. 
 
Quantity discounts 
Physical 
separation 
The components are not located on the same geographical 
location. 
 
Example from the interviews: because the areas of the works 
were adjacent to each other, we could buy it as a bundle. 
Logistics costs 
Table 1 – the bundling attributes and their effects - continued 
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To the attributes already mentioned in the literature like competition (Jap, 2002), economies of scale 
(Birou, Fawcett and Magnan, 1997) and purchasing effort (Looman, Ruffin and de Boer, 2002), we add 
the bundle attributes dependency, selection, outsourcing, specialization and physical separation. All the 
bundle attributes have effects on the value of the bundle.  In the decision about which degree of 
bundling to choose, purchasers have to combine all, or at least some of the effects of the attributes into 
a specific bundle value curve. Only then they will be able to find the optimal degree of bundling for 
their buying situation. Still there is the matter of which degree of bundling, homogenous or 
heterogeneous as described in the critical analysis, would be most appropriate. We propose that not all 
attributes of the bundle change the bundle value when a solely homogeneous or heterogeneous 
bundling strategy is pursued. In the interviews, we discovered when a sole strategy was pursued; some 
attributes were not relevant in the decision to bundle. In Table 2 we show that only 5 out of 8 of the 
bundling attributes have effect on both degrees of bundling. This has practical implications for the 
purchasers, as it simplifies the bundling decision. 
 
Possible change of the bundle value by Bundling attributes 
homogeneous bundling  heterogeneous bundling 
Integration no  yes 
Selection  yes  yes 
Coordination yes  yes 
Specialization no  yes 
Competition yes  yes 
Buying costs yes  yes 
Economies of scale yes  no 
Location yes  yes 
Table 2 – the influence of bundle strategy on bundle value 
 
The conclusion of these analyses is that we can visualize components of bundle value. In addition, we 
can point out differences in these components when pursuing homogeneous or heterogeneous bundling 
strategies. From a practical point view an assessment of bundling attributes makes it easier for a 
practitioner to find the right degree of bundling. 
 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has explored the various attributes of bundles from a buyer’s perspective. We add to 
literature by presenting an overview of attributes and their effects on the value of bundling. We also 
propose a framework which simplifies bundling decisions for purchasers. However, this article has 
several limitations that further research could address. 
 
First, the list of attributes has been generated from the experiences of many purchasers and we tried to 
find as many attributes as possible, but we do not claim having found every bundling attribute. To 
make the list more complete, further research could focus on finding more attributes of bundles that are 
relevant in the bundling decisions. Second, when changing the degree of bundling, it is not yet clear 
how the effects of the bundling attributes change. In this paper we propose some examples how the 
curves of the effects could look like, but we only do this with the purpose of clarifying the concept. 
Further research could focus on the question how these effects influence the bundling value. For 
example, the effects of the bundle attribute selection on bundling (Linthorst and Telgen, 2008). Finally, 
we plan to further investigate how an optimal degree of bundling can be determined.  
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